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Credit rating agencies, through close relationships with (elite) news-media, 
hold a strong position in the specialist mediated discourse of contemporary 
financial capitalism that circulates narrowly among governmental, regulatory 
and corporate actors. Additionally, by issuing ratings on countries’ 
creditworthiness, the agencies hold the discursive power to affect, positively 
or negatively, the economic well-being of states and their citizens. Such was 
the case during Ireland’s economic crisis, 2008-2013, when the world’s three 
main rating agencies - Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard and Poor’s - 
progressively downgraded the country’s sovereign rating. This study, through 
the lens of the watchdog and informed-citizenry functions of the Irish print-
media, examines how the agencies were positioned in Irish news-discourse 
during this period. It evaluates the print-media’s routine level of critical 
reflection on the agencies’ role in global financial markets and their actual or 
potential influence on Ireland’s economic condition. Further, it interrogates the 
degree to which news-coverage of rating actions was constructed within a 
closed network of elite institutional discourse (financial, political, regulatory). 
The study suggests that, even in the midst of a national and global financial 
crisis, the Irish print-media tended to reproduce the perceived legitimacy, 
authority and relevance of the rating agencies as elite institutional actors and 
unproblematically accept the structures, mechanisms and values of the wider 
‘market’ system.  
 
KEYWORDS financial crisis; credit rating agencies; news-media; financial 
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Introduction 
 
“We do not expect turbulence in the housing market and low growth for a year 
or two to undermine Ireland’s AAA rating,” announced credit rating agency Fitch in 
January 2008. Despite pointing to “elements of excessive investment” that were 
vulnerable to “sharp correction”, the agency maintained Ireland at the top of its 
ratings scale on the back of “strong public finances, a sound banking sector and 
economic flexibility and diversity” (Fitch 2008). 
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By year’s end, the Irish economy was in a deep crisis. The Government was 
cutting billions of euros from the national budget and had issued a blanket guarantee 
on the debts of a domestic banking sector that was near to collapse. The following 
years brought to Ireland a shrivelling domestic economy, worsening unemployment, 
rising emigration, weakened health and welfare protections, and strains on social 
cohesion. Late in 2010, with the nation’s finances still deteriorating, the Government 
entered an external bailout programme administered by “the Troika”: the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the European Central Bank. 
 Through the years of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economic boom (broadly, mid-
1990s to mid-2000s), the country received the top investment-grade, AAA, from the 
world’s three most influential rating agencies: Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (S&P), 
and Fitch. Rating agencies, among other functions, provide opinions to investors on 
the projected risks involved in lending to countries. Ireland’s AAA rating signalled to 
international investors that, in the agencies’ estimation, the country was a low risk 
debtor. 
As the boom gave way to crisis, the Government became increasingly reliant 
on borrowings from global capital markets to plug deficits in the national budget. A 
vicious cycle began to turn in 2009: the more the Government borrowed, the lower 
the rating agencies ranked its ability to repay debt on time. Sentiments of increased 
risk were a factor in international investors demanding higher interest rates to take 
on fresh issues of Irish debt, which weakened the country’s position further. By the 
time of the Troika bailout, Ireland’s sovereign credit rating with Moody’s, S&P and 
Fitch had withered to non-investment grades, warning investors that the agencies 
viewed the country as a risky debtor. 
 Each downgrade, as Ireland’s AAA rating turned to junk, was flagged in the 
Irish news-media as a marker of the country’s economic collapse. But the discourse 
emerging from rating agencies did not simply chart the fall of Ireland’s economy: 
through their rating actions, the agencies were actors in shaping the country’s 
struggle to maintain access to funding on global capital markets. Some five years 
into the crisis, in a speech to the European Parliament, Irish President Michael D. 
Higgins reflected on the power of the rating agencies, saying citizens across the 
continent were “suffering the consequences of actions and opinions of bodies such 
as ratings agencies, which, unlike Parliaments, are unaccountable” (Higgins 2013). 
The following year, he described the rating agencies as “increasingly coming to 
define the lifeworld and prospects of European citizens” (Higgins 2014). 
This study connects the accountability of rating agencies as elite institutional 
actors to the watchdog and informed-citizenry functions of the news-media, which 
was the primary means by which Irish citizens were made aware of the complex 
processes eroding the country’s economic health. The study tracks the embedding of 
rating agencies in print-news discourse from 2008, when the economic crisis began 
to fracture Irish society, to 2013, when the country exited the Troika bailout 
programme. Of specific concern to the study are the following:  
 The routine level of explanation and critical scrutiny in news-discourse of the 
rating agencies’ role in global financial markets and their potential or actual 
influence on Ireland’s economic condition 
 The extent to which news-discourse assimilated or contested the market 
values encoded in the agencies’ rating actions 
 The degree to which news-coverage of rating actions was constructed within 
a closed network of elite institutional discourse (financial, political, regulatory) 
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or was pitched as a more open discourse, accommodating alternative 
perspectives, and remaining accessible to general (non-specialist) audiences 
 The propensity of news-discourse on rating agencies to critically reflect on or 
unproblematically reproduce the norms, values and logics of a wider 
financial/capitalist system experiencing a crisis period 
The study adopts a historically-grounded approach, positioning the Irish print-
media’s coverage of rating agencies within broader historical processes 
underpinning the commodification and mediated transmission of market-relevant 
information.  
 
Capitalism, the Commodification of Market-Relevant Information by 
News-Media and Rating Agencies, and Global Capital Markets 
 
Capitalism has gained in complexity, shifted in character and extended in 
global reach since its early formations in the sixteenth century. One fundamental 
feature has remained constant, however: the centrality of information in underpinning 
capitalistic decisions on resource allocations, production and commodity exchange, 
and in supporting the socio- and geo-spatial co-ordination and inter-dependence 
embedded in a world economy (Lechner and Boli 2008). Historically, as feudal 
Europe’s social, economic and communication structures eroded, merchants in 
emergent capitalism increasingly recognised the commodity value of having access 
to timely and specialised information of relevance to commerce. Such information, 
often gathered by travellers, traders or soldiers, tended to circulate within closed elite 
networks. As Conboy highlights, in the sixteenth century “formal news came as 
private letters not as a public discourse” (2004, 7), with, for instance, wealthy families 
commissioning news-letters to inform their commercial and political interests.  
The later development of industrial mass media and the formulation of news 
as a saleable commodity provided a firmer basis for the routinised gathering and 
circulation of information that could underpin capitalistic activities. That such 
information could be transmitted instantly over great distances with the emergence of 
the telegraph in the mid-1800s further lubricated the operations of advanced 
industrial capitalism (Briggs and Burke 2010).  
Another signal in this period of the strengthening relationship between media 
and capitalism was the emergence of news agencies such as Reuters. Drawing on 
international networks of stringers and correspondents, and exploiting the new 
technology of electric communication, they facilitated the swift transfer of commercial 
and financial information, commodity pricing updates, and political and socio-
economic news. In so doing, they contributed to the expansion of national and 
international markets for trade (MacGregor 2013). By wholesaling information to 
newspaper companies, news agencies enhanced the scope of publications such as 
The Times of London to carry up-to-date notices on stocks, bonds and other forms of 
market data. This may suggest that, by the mid- to late-1800s, news (even of a 
specialist nature) had shifted from a private to a public discourse. However, publicly 
available newspapers such as The Times positioned themselves as elite 
publications, funnelling specialist financial, economic and political information to the 
wealthier and most influential strata of society (Conboy 2004). 
In the late-1800s, a new type of agency was assuming a significant role in 
facilitating the internationalisation of industrial and financial capitalism and in 
reinforcing market orthodoxies: rating agencies. Their niche function, selling credit 
opinion, marked a further commodification of investment-sensitive information, which 
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circulated as an elite discourse within a closed network of clients: investors, 
corporate actors, governments, and specialist news-media. Rating agencies began 
as nationally focused enterprises but in their recent history they have been operating 
globally, an expansion mirrored in the entities they rate: from companies, originally, 
to corporations and sovereigns (countries). The trajectory of their historical 
development would seem to track the wider globalising tendencies in capitalism’s 
advancement, particularly around the international flows of finance and the rise of 
global capital markets. As such markets and processes matured in the twentieth 
century, rating agencies facilitated the emergence of a global financial infrastructure 
whose inner workings were, at least in the case of American corporate interests, “a 
total mystery to the population at large” (Schiller 1989, 13). 
Accompanying the emergence of industrial mass media, news agencies and 
rating agencies in the mid-1800s to early-1900s was a re-alignment of dominant 
thought around capitalistic activities, in the form of neo-classical economics. The 
earlier tradition of political economy, informed by thinkers such as Smith, Marx and 
Ricardo, strove to understand the “great capitalist upheaval” and had a concern for 
the “social totality”: to interrogating the connections between the economic, political, 
social and cultural (Mosco 2009). Neo-classical economic thought tended to remove 
itself from such wider considerations, focusing narrowly on “determinable and 
measurable choices made in the marketplace for capital, labour, and consumer 
goods and services” (Mosco 2009, 46). Advancements in communication and 
transport infrastructures energised capitalism in creating impersonal markets, 
coordinated across great distances, and comprised of anonymous buyers and sellers 
(Carey 1988, 206). These developments consolidated free market principles, which 
Gray suggests weakened the link between local economies and social cohesion and 
marked out the foundations of market mechanisms that were “without regard to their 
effects on society” (2008, 25). Wood, too, identifies early capitalistic processes as 
reconfiguring socio-economic relations to create “a type of market with no historical 
precedent” (2002, 103), and one which broadened significantly the range of what 
could be formulated and exchanged as a commodity.  
The drift of historical processes from this period has reached a contemporary 
financial and corporate discourse concerned, perhaps exclusively, with abstract and 
impersonal “markets”. Rating agencies have embedded themselves in capitalistic 
structures as providers of informational metrics to corporate, governmental and 
regulatory actors operating in these increasingly diversified, complex and globalised 
spaces. 
Capital markets, through which countries can access external sources of 
funds, are such a space. Their importance grew significantly in the 1980s and 1990s 
when many countries, particularly developing nations, liberalised their domestic 
financial markets (Ocampo et al. 2008). Advocates of capital market liberalisation 
argued that it would promote stability by allowing countries to access a wider range 
of funds, and thereby promote “economic growth and efficiency and reduce risk” 
(Ocampo et al. 2008, 3). What has become more apparent since the 1980s is that 
global capital markets are volatile, prone to infection by market irrationality, 
exuberance or pessimism, and may fuel the boom and bust conditions associated 
with investor herding. Global capital markets can leave deep scars when sentiment 
turns against a country. As Ocampo et al. suggest, “The recessions that accompany 
sharp contractions of external financing have high social costs” (2008, 1-2). 
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Journalism and the Financial Crisis 
 
The news-media acting as the public’s watchdog on power was among the 
operational ideologies to emerge from journalism’s professionalisation in the late-
1800s. An associated responsibility was that journalism would provide the timely 
information on current affairs necessary for an informed citizenry to engage with 
democracy (McChesney and Pickard 2011). By the 1920s, however, public 
intellectual Walter Lippmann was already speaking of a democratic deficit in that 
capitalism, as he saw it, had “grown too big and complex for crucial events to be 
mastered by the average citizen” (Alterman 2011, 8). Lippmann had little confidence 
in the ability of the news-media to bridge the gap between capitalism’s complexity 
and citizens’ comprehension, claiming “no newspaper reports [the average citizen’s] 
environment so that he can grasp it” (2009, 3-4). Identifying problems in the 
“economic basis of journalism”, Lippmann believed that the news-media was better 
suited to reporting events than interpreting processes (2012, 21). It was in particular 
trouble when the issue didn’t lend itself to a simple yes/no answer or for/against 
debate but required a nuanced consideration of balanced evidence (Alterman 2011). 
Almost nine decades later, the depth, complexity and persistence of the 
current economic crisis has raised uncomfortable questions for a broad range of 
political, regulatory and corporate actors. The news-media has come under scrutiny, 
also. An urgent concern has been the limitations of dominant news-models in 
explaining to the public the intricate and multi-dimensional processes underpinning 
the crisis. Strong attention has been directed to the adequacy with which the news-
media performed a watchdog role in alerting the public to the unfolding crisis and in 
holding elite stakeholders to account (Tambini 2010; Usher 2013; Manning 2013). 
The current crisis is not the first time that, in the main, the news-media has failed to 
detect or recognise the signals of approaching economic turbulence (Schifferes and 
Coulter 2013). As the Great Depression emerged in the United States in the late-
1920s, notes Sims, “the economic condition of the country was not widely 
understood or much noticed in standard newspaper journalism” (2007, 131-132). 
Usher highlights that “business news misses and failures are scattered throughout 
recent history” (2013, 192), while Manning has pointed to “the failure of the financial 
media to spot the disaster coming” (2013, 174). 
An intriguing line of research inquiry has been whether business and financial 
journalists define themselves as having a market and corporate watchdog role. In the 
findings of recent work, the answer has been closer to no than to yes. Attachment to 
notions of a watchdog role was weakest, Tambini found, among business and 
financial journalists who saw “their main role as supplying investors with market-
relevant information” and who tended not to critically reflect on what they were 
reporting (2010, 160). Usher, too, concluded that such journalists tend to lack a 
“consistent sense of public responsibility or accountability” (2013, 203). Deeper 
public interest concerns may be obscured amid their daily challenge to make 
increasingly complex “financial data newsworthy” (Manning 2013, 179). Further, 
business and financial journalism’s routine focus on reporting company results, 
mergers and acquisitions tends to blinker coverage to “focus on the particular and 
the discrete, rather than the macro and holistic” (Manning 2013, 183). Similarly 
clouded perspectives emerged among Irish financial journalists when asked to clarify 
their roles and responsibilities in relation to coverage of the Celtic Tiger boom 
(O’Brien 2015; Fahy 2014). 
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Enduring within financial journalism is a historical tension surrounding its core 
purpose: whether it is to underpin professional practices in the financial sector or to 
apply critical scrutiny on behalf of the public. Elite financial news-media have tended 
to be aligned closely to the underpinning of financial professional practices. But the 
tension remains unresolved even among general-interest newspapers, which 
traditionally have defined themselves more explicitly as having watchdog functions. 
General-interest newspapers with specialist business sections have been found to 
discretely segregate their audiences into professional and non-professional, 
emphasising metrics-based reports (earnings) in the financial pages and impact 
narratives (cost to taxpayers) in the regular news sections (Fahy 2014). 
Narrow, and effectively closed, source-journalist networks have emerged as a 
consistent theme in research on journalism and the current economic crisis. Davis 
has identified “elite discourse networks” through which the corporate sector has 
effectively “captured” financial and business news (2000, 286). A consequence, he 
argues, is that “most debates covering business and financial issues...are highly 
influenced by corporate elite objectives, norms and values” (2000, 299-300). On a 
related track, Berry speaks of a “restricted range of opinion in financial journalism” 
(2013, 254). In an analysis of how the BBC radio programme Today reported the 
UK’s 2008 banking crisis, he found that a narrow set of high-profile politicians, 
regulators, IMF spokespeople and City sources dominated discourse, with elite 
financial sector sources “viewed as the main repositories of expert knowledge in 
what is a complex area” (2013, 267). He noted, also, how the sources in general 
tended to be pro-market, but that the programme tended to treat City sources as 
impartial commentators even though they were “partisan actors who [had] a stake in 
the maintenance of the status quo” (2013, 267). 
That financial news-discourse is threaded with a narrow range of elite sources 
is consistent with a broader trend: even the better resourced news-media 
organisations build their information gathering routines around a small number of 
institutions that are considered to be reliable sources of news (Golding and Elliot 
1999). This tends to reinforce the perceived legitimacy of such sources, enhancing 
their prospects of leading the journalist-source relationship and acting as the primary 
definers of what is news (Carlson 2007; Davis 2009). 
The narrowness of sources in financial and economic news has been 
reflected, also, in research on the Irish news-media’s reporting of the Celtic Tiger 
boom and subsequent crash. Fahy et al. (2010) suggest that Irish business and 
financial journalists during the boom gathered information and opinion within tight 
“elite-elite” source networks and that this contributed to a lack of criticism within 
news-coverage of regulatory actors and economic policy. An analysis of broadcast 
news in the three months following the Government’s issuing of the bank guarantee 
in 2008 identified an orientation towards elite sources (City and business 
representatives, mainstream politicians, journalist ‘experts’) to interpret the crisis, to 
the extent that there was a “complete absence of ‘alternative’ voices and opinions” 
(Rafter 2014, 603). Within an elite dominated discourse, Fahy has detected a 
stronger critical perspective in Irish financial journalism post-crash than was evident 
pre-crash when journalists and commentators who raised doubts about the 
economy’s sustainability “were marginalised” and not given “sustained prominence” 
in coverage (2014, 130). Under formal and informal pressure to publish positive 
news on the economy, journalists who wrote negative stories were sometimes 
punished by being excluded from off-the-record briefings (O’Brien 2015). Another 
factor that softened reporting of the boom was that several Irish news organisations 
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were enjoying increased advertising revenues, particularly from property (Preston 
and Silke 2011). As Fahy points out, media companies are themselves “financial 
entities” and are not “detached observers of, or immune to, economic booms and 
busts” (2014, 131). 
 
S&P, Moody’s and Fitch  
 
S&P’s lineage reaches back to the 1860s, a period when “transparency and 
availability of corporate records, company financial dealings and independent third-
party analysis [was] very limited” (S&P 2013a). The company’s first publication was a 
manual on the financial operations of US railroad companies. By the early-1900s, it 
was publishing statistics on stocks and bonds. S&P was acquired by the McGraw-Hill 
Companies in 1966, and the agency describes its development since then as pursing 
an “expanding role in global markets” (S&P 2013a). S&P employs 6,000 people 
across 25 countries. 
Moody’s first publications more than a century ago also focused on the US 
railroad industry. In its modern configuration, Moody’s Corporation has been publicly 
traded since 2000 and issues credit ratings through its Investors Service. In 2013, 
Moody’s Corporation employed 9,500 people across 33 countries, reported revenues 
of $3bn, and issued ratings on more than 100 countries (Moody’s 2014).  
Fitch, founded in 1913, is owned by Fimalac and the Hearst Corporation. 
Fimalac has interests in real estate, while Hearst has extensive media operations in 
print and broadcast. In 2011/2012, Fitch reported revenues of €789m and employed 
2,400 people across more than 50 countries (Fimalac 2014). 
 
Ratings Agencies’ Business Models  
 
“Simply put,” says Fitch, “ratings are a credit opinion” (Fitch 2013a). That 
opinion focuses on the ability of an issuer (a borrower) to repay its debts to investors 
on time. Ratings scales vary across the three agencies, but AAA is the standardised 
top rating. Moody’s claims that, for issuers, a credit rating “provides a superior 
‘passport’ to the global capital markets” (Moody’s 2013b), arguing that the historical 
trend has been for its higher rated bonds to attract the lowest interest rates, and vice 
versa. 
Credit ratings may be adjusted to reflect an issuer’s current or anticipated 
circumstances. Rating actions are the mechanism through which agencies make 
positive or negative changes to an issuer’s credit rating, or signal to investors that an 
issuer is “on watch” for a future change. A rating action may also be used, 
periodically, to affirm that an issuer’s credit rating remains an appropriate 
assessment of risk. 
Both issuers and investors pay for the services of rating agencies. Charging 
investors to access the information and rationales underpinning credit ratings is the 
agencies’ older business model. Charging issuers to be rated is a newer practice, 
emerging in the late-1960s on the rationale that “issuers should pay for the 
substantial value objective ratings provide in terms of market access” (Moody’s 
2013c). The rating agencies stress that the receipt of a fee from an issuer does not 
affect the objectivity of a credit rating. In 2013, S&P stated that for a sovereign rating 
“fees typically range from $50,000 to $250,000” (S&P 2013c). 
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Each agency attaches an important qualification to its credit ratings. Fitch 
states, “Ratings are not facts, and therefore cannot be described as being ‘accurate’ 
or ‘inaccurate’” (Fitch 2013d). S&P describes credit ratings as “statements of opinion 
as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact” (S&P 2013b). Moody’s, 
meanwhile, cautions, “A credit rating is forward-looking, and, by its very nature, 
subjective” (Moody’s 2013a).  
According to Fitch, country ratings allow “investors assess sovereign debt 
opportunities with confidence” (Fitch 2013c). In forming a sovereign credit rating, 
S&P considers factors including demographics, wealth, growth prospects, budget 
reserves, structural government performance, fiscal and monetary policy, and 
“contingent liabilities associated with potential support for the financial sector” (S&P 
2013b). The Irish Government’s liabilities through guaranteeing banking sector debt 
became a burden on the country’s credit rating from September 2008. 
(Elite) news-media is a key consideration in the rating agencies’ routine 
commercial activities. Each agency issues media releases, provides contact details 
of press officers, and maintains robust online databases of reports and 
commentaries. Moody’s informs clients that dissemination of information to (elite) 
news-media is part of its credit rating service. “For a public rating, the new rating is 
distributed by press release simultaneously to the major financial media worldwide” 
(Moody’s 2013a). Such activities and communication structures position rating 
agencies as easily accessible and reliable sources of news, and helps to embed 
them in the specialist mediated discourse underpinning financial capitalism.  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Method 
 
Print-media articles in the sample were gathered through the Nexis database 
for a seven day period after the issuing by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P of an action on 
Ireland’s sovereign credit rating. For each rating action, the issuing agency’s title was 
employed as the prime search keyword. Only articles that referred specifically to 
actions on Ireland’s sovereign credit rating were retained for analysis. (The keyword 
search sometimes captured news-reports on downgrades to Irish companies and 
banks. Such articles were excluded from the sample if they contained no reference 
to an action on Ireland’s sovereign rating). The one week print news-cycle allowed 
for the inclusion of Sunday newspapers and also enabled the researcher to capture 
editorial commentary and interpretative source comments as they filtered through 
news-discourse. A key goal of the study was to track the positioning of rating 
agencies in a deep sample of Irish print news-discourse, so no national newspaper 
was excluded from the search. Eight newspapers returned relevant material (Figure 
2). A limitation of the approach was that Nexis did not provide access to a small 
number of national titles, for example, the Irish Daily Star. 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 A content analysis underpins the study. The code-sheet was constructed 
through a grounded approach, with the researcher anticipating that pre-determined 
coding-measures would provide a less accurate outline of print-media engagement 
with sovereign rating actions than those that emerged organically through article 
analysis. Interpreting and selecting what were the most important coding-measures 
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did introduce an element of subjectivity to the study, but defining a purely objective 
set of coding categories has been identified as a problematic dimension to content 
analyses more generally (Harcup and O’Neill 2001). Having detected a coding-
measure (defined as a summary indicator of a discursive feature or 
argument/opinion recurring in news-discourse), the researcher interpreted whether it 
was encoded in subsequent articles. Finally, the researcher calculated, for each year 
and in the sample overall, the percentage of articles in which a coding measure was 
detected (Figure 3). To maintain consistency, the researcher alone coded the 
sample. Articles coded early in this phase of the research were cross-checked for 
coding-measures that had been established on the final version of the code-sheet. 
Full article text, including headlines, was set as the unit of analysis. Given the 
scale, complexity and severity of Ireland’s economic difficulties, articles carrying 
news of a sovereign rating action also tended to include information and institutional 
source comment on a wider range of economic, political and social issues. In 
examining each article, the researcher’s primary concern was to capture through 
coding-measures the pattern and persistence of news-discourse that related 
specifically to actions on Ireland’s sovereign credit rating.  
  
Embedding of Rating Agencies in News-Discourse 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
“What sometimes seems to be forgotten is that [rating agencies] are limited 
companies whose raison d’être is to make money,” wrote the Irish Independent in a 
barbed response to Ireland’s sovereign credit rating being downgraded to junk (July 
14, 2011). It might have been more accurate to say that, in Irish print news-
discourse, the commercial institutional basis of the rating agencies was rarely 
acknowledged rather than sometimes forgotten. An indicator of this was the rarity 
with which the rating agencies were referred to as privately owned companies: in 3% 
of articles overall, while in the peak years of actions on Ireland’s rating, 2009 and 
2010, the percentages were 3% and <1%. Infrequent, also, were references to the 
rating agencies’ business models or commercial stake in the global financial system: 
6% overall, 2% in 2009, and 8% in 2010. 
 The backgrounding of the rating agencies’ commercial basis linked to one of 
the study’s main findings: that routine news-discourse tended to position them as 
impartial institutional actors and independent expert commentators: 82% overall. The 
“impartiality” with which they carried out their institutional function tended not to be 
embedded in news-discourse through overt labels or explicit descriptors. Rather, it 
tended to be established implicitly through news-texts being free of any interpretative 
source perspectives, editorial comments or salient words or phrases that suggested 
an interest compromising the rating agencies’ assumed objectivity, independence 
and authority. The strongest challenge in news-discourse to the impartial positioning 
of the rating agencies came in 2011, when Ireland was already in the Troika bailout 
programme. Even then, the percentage of articles that positioned them as impartial 
institutional actors was 78%. 
Related to this was the consistency with which rating actions (as specific 
institutional expressions of credit opinion) passed through news-discourse without 
critical scrutiny or comment: 72% overall, 78% in 2009, and 71% in 2010. An Irish 
Times report illustrated the wider pattern: “Ratings agency Moody’s has cut the 
Republic’s credit rating and said the State faces a heavy debt burden for years to 
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come” (July 2, 2009). At no point in the article was the rating action challenged or 
critically scrutinised. Neither was the article encoded with any element that would 
cast doubt on the assumed impartiality or authority of Moody’s as an institutional 
actor. 
When critical scrutiny was applied to a rating action, it was often channelled 
through a quote from an interpretative source. In one case in 2010, the state body 
charged with managing Ireland’s debt, the National Treasury Management Agency 
(NTMA), criticised a Moody’s downgrade action. The NTMA’s comments were 
carried in a number of newspapers, but The Irish Times added that, “Publicly 
challenging not only the views of a credit rating agency but its methodology is rare, if 
not unheard of, in financial markets” (August 26, 2010). Reluctance among such 
institutional sources to publicly challenge rating agencies may offer one explanation 
as to why rating actions tended to pass through news-discourse without critical 
scrutiny. 
News-discourse also tended to be encoded with brief descriptors of the rating 
agencies’ function in the global financial system: 89% overall, 91% in 2009, and 90% 
in 2010. Common descriptors, including “rating agency” and “one of the world’s 
leading rating agencies”, routinely were encoded in news-texts without any 
contextualising explanation of what the rating agencies did, what kind of 
(commercial) organisations they were, or why they issued actions. Significantly 
weaker (11% overall, 9% in 2009, 10% in 2010) was the encoding of detailed 
descriptors of the rating agencies’ function, such as the following in The Irish Times: 
“The rating is a measure of the agency's view of the ability of Ireland to meet its 
financial commitments on a timely basis. AAA is the highest possible rating” 
(September 1, 2008). The scarcity of such clarifications underpinned a persistent 
discursive pattern of events (issuing of a rating action) being separated from 
processes (function and significance of rating agencies within the global financial 
system). 
The rating agencies did not pass through news-discourse unscathed, 
however. The Sunday Independent attacked them for selling “high-grade ratings to 
their clients in the sub-prime mortgage-packaging industry” (July 17, 2011). The Irish 
Times questioned the impartiality of their core business model: “If you want a 
definition of conflict of interest, the issuer-pays model is it” (August 26, 2010). But in 
the sample overall, such criticisms flared briefly. Only 8% of articles (overall and in 
2010) were encoded with questions or concerns about the influence of rating 
agencies on the global and/or Irish economies, as when The Irish Times warned that 
they “amplify the well-recognised herding problem in financial markets” (July 14, 
2011). Such scrutiny rarely extended to deeper questioning of the “market” itself, or 
to the values, norms or mechanisms underpinning it. 
 News-discourse placed a greater emphasis on the actual or potential 
negative/positive consequences of rating actions. In this discursive strain, the Irish 
Independent noted, “Downgrades from Fitch and other rating agencies such as S&P 
and Moody’s raise the cost of government borrowing” (November 11, 2009). In more 
dramatic terms, the Sunday Independent suggested that “downgrading…is the 
precursor to acute economic misery” (April 29, 2012). Discursive connections 
between rating actions and their (actual/potential) negative consequences registered 
in 47% of articles overall, with (actual/potential) positive consequences registering in 
6%. The encoding of (actual/potential) consequences was 50% negative and <1% 
positive in 2010, after which Ireland disengaged from borrowing on global capital 
markets. The study suggests that across the crisis period the (actual/potential) 
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consequences of rating actions were absent from a significant strand of news-
discourse. The routine detachment of rating actions from consequences was 
surprising given the recognition by one newspaper that “international markets 
certainly abide by the iron rule of credit ratings” (Sunday Business Post, November 
8, 2009). 
 
Institutional Sources 
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
A stable and narrow network of elite institutional sources, falling broadly into 
the categories of financial, political and regulatory, was embedded in news-discourse 
as responding to, commenting on, or offering analysis of actions on Ireland’s 
sovereign credit rating. Financial sector sources (stockbrokers, analysts, private 
sector economists) were the most frequently encoded grouping, at 35% of all 
sources quoted. Similar to the rating agencies, financial sector sources tended to be 
positioned unproblematically as impartial experts, not as stakeholders in the financial 
system. An Irish Examiner news-article was illustrative of this wider discursive 
pattern: “Davy economist…said the move by Moody’s was a ‘surprise’” (April 16, 
2011). Similarly, two years earlier, the same newspaper positioned a Bloxham 
Stockbrokers economist as an impartial expert when interpreting a Moody’s 
downgrade action as “no great surprise” (April 18, 2009). The news-texts failed to 
identify Davy and Bloxham Stockbrokers as commercial organisations, or articulate 
why their economists had legitimacy as interpretative sources.  
 During the coding phase, the study mapped the range and relative 
amplification of opinion/arguments attributed to each category of institutional source. 
Overall, 23% of the arguments/opinions attributed to financial sector sources 
accepted the rationale for a rating action (“no great surprise”), while 15% challenged 
a rating action (“a surprise”). While this may suggest a reasonable balance between 
approval and critical comment, financial source criticisms tended to be confined to 
specific actions or individual rating agencies, and seldom strayed into deeper 
criticisms of market mechanisms, logics or values. Also, financial sources had a 
strong encoding of opinion calling on the Government to initiate budgetary measures 
in response to a rating action or to heed rating agency scrutiny: 19% overall, but 
33% in 2009. In this vein, a private sector economist warned the Government that 
“the impact of whatever [budgetary] measures are introduced will no doubt be 
scrutinised by the rating agencies” (Irish Examiner, March 13, 2009). 
 Government was the next most frequently encoded category of institutional 
source, at 18%. Seeking to reassure markets in light of a rating action (15%) was 
among the strongest lines of argument attributed to Government sources, as when 
the Finance Minister responded to an S&P downgrade by claiming that “difficulties [in 
the public finances] will be addressed” (Irish Times, January 10, 2009). Government 
opinion/arguments with a stronger amplification in news-discourse included the 
following: defence of government policy and measures (17%), direct criticism of a 
rating action (21%), and claims that ratings agencies were interfering in Irish 
democracy and damaging the country’s economic future (26%). Amplification of the 
latter two arguments intensified in March and April 2009, following a radio interview 
in which an S&P analyst suggested that the Government needed “new faces”. As the 
comment gained traction in the news agenda, the Irish Independent reported the 
Taoiseach [Prime Minister] as having “attacked” a “foreign” credit rating agency. “Mr 
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Cowen questioned whether [S&P analyst] knew as much about Irish politics as 
international finances” (April 1, 2009).  
 The Opposition (13% of all institutional sources) were most frequently 
encoded in news-discourse as drawing on a rating action to criticise the Government 
(40%), an example of the wider pattern being when a finance spokesperson “said 
S&P’s assessment was ‘yet more evidence of the Government's appalling handling’ 
of the boom-to-bust economy” (Irish Times, March 31, 2009). Such a discursive 
construction conferred authority on the rating agency, even if the purpose was to 
retool the rating action to serve the Opposition source’s own sectional interests. 
 The NTMA (11% of all institutional sources) was encoded most often as 
criticising downgrade actions: 65% overall, but 82% in 2010. Even within the 
pressurised atmosphere surrounding Ireland’s credit rating, the NTMA’s discursive 
pattern tended to be positioned as falling outside the behavioural norms of an 
institution that engaged with financial markets on behalf of the state. The Irish Times 
described the NTMA’s criticism of an S&P downgrade action as “not the smartest 
response” (August 26, 2010). The Irish Independent suggested that in directly 
questioning S&P the NTMA had taken an “unusual step” (August 26, 2010). Even 
here, however, the NTMA reflected the pattern of financial sector sources in isolating 
critical comments to individual rating actions or agencies: “It [NTMA] described the 
assumptions behind [the downgrade action] as ‘extreme’,” continued the Irish 
Independent’s report. Through omission of scrutiny, the wider context of market 
structures and mechanisms was implicitly accepted as unproblematic. 
Not only did a narrow range of elite institutional sources tend to dominate 
comment on rating actions, they tended to express a narrow range of opinion, 
argument and interpretation. These institutional sources may have advanced critical 
views on the timing of or rationale underpinning rating actions, but this occurred in a 
broader discursive context of rating actions passing through 72% of articles without 
critical scrutiny or comment.  
 
Media Commentary on Rating Actions 
 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
Media commentaries (editorials and opinion/analysis pieces written by 
journalists or regular columnists) also tended to amplify a narrow range of 
arguments/opinions. Most prominent was acceptance of a rating action (31%). 
Moreover, media commentaries tended to follow acceptance of a rating action by 
calling on the Government to take action to reassure or placate the rating agencies 
(20%). Along these lines, The Sunday Business Post linked the Government’s “much 
diminished credibility” to the country’s withering creditworthiness, advising the 
cabinet to “urgently formulate a fiscal stabilisation strategy” (January 11, 2009). The 
most prominent critical argument was to highlight rating agencies’ past mistakes 
(19%), as when the Sunday Independent argued that S&P’s “own credibility record is 
suspect” (August 20, 2010). 
 Media commentaries tended to focus criticisms on specific rating actions or 
agencies, and apply weaker scrutiny to market mechanisms and structures. 
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Discussion 
 
Within the continued evolution of capitalism, the media, and in particular elite 
financial media, has played a pivotal role in the increasing abstraction of markets 
from local and social contexts and has facilitated the widening formulation of what, 
globally, could be traded as a commodity. Rating agencies have played a parallel 
role in such processes, most notably in smoothing the mobility of finance through 
global capital markets and in positioning information and opinion on credit risk (and, 
thereby, debt) as a tradable commodity. From the public’s perspective, global capital 
markets may seem to operate obscurely and without relevance in the background, 
but transactions in this arena can have tangible consequences, potentially positive or 
negative, for countries and their citizens. 
The most common intersection of rating agencies and the media tends to 
occur at an elite level, in the mediated financial discourse that circulates, narrowly, 
among governmental, state, regulatory, financial sector and corporate actors. Prior 
research suggests that such discourse tends to reinforce rather than challenge 
dominant market values, logics and mechanisms, and that business and financial 
journalism tends to be more consistent with transmission models of news than with 
conceptions of media as a watchdog on power or as fulfilling an informed-citizenry 
function. 
 In Ireland, as the country’s economy deteriorated, general news-publications 
directed increased attention to Moody’s, S&P and Fitch as they issued sovereign 
downgrade actions. Despite holding vested interests in the global financial system, 
rating agencies project themselves as objective analysts – an image which sustains 
the reputational capital (perceived authority/legitimacy) that is crucial to their core 
business of selling (credit) opinion. The potency and resilience of the agencies’ self-
defined image as “objective” actors was reflected in their routine positioning in news-
discourse as impartial expert commentators (82%), and the backgrounding of their 
commercial institutional basis as private, profit-orientated companies (3%). Ongoing 
(elite) news-media legitimation is commercially and institutionally significant to rating 
agencies because they are primarily discursive actors, seeking through their actions 
and ratings to influence and/or provide services to corporate, governmental and 
regulatory actors. The manner in which rating agencies were encoded in Irish 
general-interest newspapers also tended to reproduce their assumed legitimacy, 
credibility and authority as elite institutional actors in financial markets, and maintain 
their relevance within an elite discursive network.  
From this strong discursive foundation, rating actions tended to be reported as 
authoritative external validation of sentiment towards the Irish economy. In 
journalistic discourse, this tended to be reported in binary negative or positive terms 
as either a “boost” or a “blow”, for example, “junk status blow” (Irish Independent, 
July 13, 2011) and “major boost as agency says outlook now ‘stable’” (Irish 
Independent, July 12, 2013). This tended to establish a power imbalance through a 
discursive construction of the rating agencies as active (primary framers of the news 
issue) and the nominalised government/country/economy as passive (responding to, 
being affected by, struggling to contain and manage). It also illustrated a wider 
tendency of the print-media to assimilate more than contest the market logic 
encoded in rating agency discourse, which was reflected in the dominant drift of 
uncritical or factual reporting of rating actions (72%). As Fitch has stated, “Ratings 
are not facts” (Fitch 2013d). In this light, uncritical reporting of rating actions could be 
interpreted as the print-media amplifying opinions that elite institutional actors formed 
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through particular sets of pro-market norms, values, assumptions and modelling 
criteria.  
Critical perspectives tended to be weaved through a relatively thin strand of 
news-discourse, and were most likely to focus on what were perceived to be flaws in 
the rationale underpinning rating actions, or on their timing, or on perceptions that 
the agencies’ actions were out of synch with the “market”. In this regard, The Sunday 
Business Post commented that “[rating agencies] are simply chasing the market. 
They are always last to know” (October 10, 2010). In more restrained terms, a 
financial sector source in The Irish Times said, “Investors have already priced in the 
higher risks associated with Irish debt…mitigating the effect of Moody’s warning 
yesterday” (April 17, 2009). The “market”, meanwhile, tended to be presented in 
news-discourse unproblematically as an external fact, reflecting the wider trend of 
critical media and institutional source perspectives being applied more to specifics 
(rating agencies, actions) than to systems. 
The focus on specifics was apparent, also, in the lack of routine critical 
reflection on the rating agencies’ function in the global financial system. The 
dominance of brief descriptors (89%), and the shallow level of explanation and 
contexualisation embedded in them, suggested that news-discourse on rating 
actions was conducted more in a closed network of elite discourse (political, 
regulatory, financial) and less in an open discourse, accommodating alternative 
perspectives. Related to this, the (potential/actual) consequences of rating actions 
was absent from a significant swath of news-discourse. The routine detachment of 
rating actions from consequences was consistent with the wider discursive trend of 
focusing on specifics (events) above systems (processes). This would seem to be 
symptomatic of a news-model that was more events-driven (reactive) than process-
sensitive (reflective). 
The embedding of a tightly bounded network of elite institutional sources to 
interpret the meaning of rating actions, and the defined paths of news-media 
information gathering that it implies, was a finding consistent with earlier research on 
financial journalism (Berry 2013). Elite institutional sources also tended to advance a 
constricted range of views, most of which were unquestioning of or compatible with 
the wider context of the “market”. The sourcing pattern indicates that elite institutions 
had a tendency to appropriate rating actions to try to reproduce their own legitimacy 
as financial and political stakeholders. As with rating agencies, the sectional interests 
and motivations of political, financial and regulatory institutional sources were rarely 
articulated in news-discourse. 
The presentation of aggregated findings from the content analysis is not 
intended to suggest that the eight newspapers in the sample adopted a homogenous 
approach to reporting rating actions. Rather, the aim is to illustrate the broad 
landscape of how the Irish print-media engaged with the issue. That said, the 
discursive patterns, debate parameters and ideological underpinnings of print-media 
coverage tended not to vary significantly across newspapers, or across the shifting 
socio-economic and political contexts that emerged during the study’s six year 
timeframe. Variation across newspapers tended to surface in editorial tone or in 
degree of emphasis rather than in the offering of an alternative paradigm of 
coverage. 
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Concluding Comments 
 
Directing editorial attention to rating agencies as elite institutional actors could 
be viewed as coming under the Irish print-media’s watchdog and informed-citizenry 
functions. The explanatory function of the news-media is especially significant in 
cases where the broader public may be affected by, but be a peripheral 
consideration to, elite-elite discourse networks (such as rating agencies to corporate, 
state and regulatory bodies). The findings of this study would suggest that Irish 
general-interest newspapers assumed many of the uncritical transmission 
characteristics that underpin elite media reporting of financial and economic news: in 
particular, deficiencies in contextualisation of processes (assuming specialist 
knowledge on behalf of the audience) and scrutiny of actor motivations and market 
mechanisms. Within the historical tension surrounding the purpose that financial 
journalism is supposed to serve, Irish general-interest newspapers would seem to 
have positioned themselves closer to a (financial professional) utility role than to a 
(public) watchdog role. 
It may be difficult to argue that the Irish print-media could have fulfilled an 
effectual watchdog or accountability role on the institutional behaviour, decisions and 
pronouncements of the rating agencies. They are global actors with little stake in 
Ireland’s sovereign well-being, and are not meaningfully accountable to the domestic 
political and regulatory actors that may fall under the Irish print-media’s sphere of 
influence. Following the economic collapse, however, the Irish print-media was weak 
even in terms of contesting the agencies’ discursive power. The predominant 
tendency was for news-discourse to reproduce the agencies’ assumed institutional 
authority, legitimacy and impartiality and to report their rating actions (opinions) 
factually and without critical scrutiny. Related weaknesses emerged in the print-
media’s informed-citizenry function: first, in routinely failing to contextualise, highlight 
and explain the agencies’ commercial institutional basis, function and vested 
interests in the global financial system; and, second, in demonstrating a persistent 
tendency to detach rating actions from actual/potential consequences. 
Irish print-media discourse on rating agencies was ideologically compatible 
with the contemporary configuration of the capitalist/market system despite the depth 
of the crisis it was experiencing, tending to accept it unproblematically as an external 
fact. But the current crisis reveals that this external fact is a delicate construct. Such 
a view reinforces the imperative of the news-media to help maintain an economically 
informed citizenry, given the impacts that market actors beyond political and national 
spheres are capable of exerting on a democratic state’s population. In this context, 
the finding that news-discourse on rating agencies tended to decontextualised 
specifics (events) from systems (processes) would do little to ease Lippmann’s near 
century old concern: that the news-media struggles to report the complexity of 
capitalism in a way which allows ordinary citizens to comprehend the economic 
forces affecting their lives. 
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Figure 2: Newspapers/articles in sample  
FORMAT: Articles each year: OVERALL        2008-2009-2010-2011-2012-2013: OVERALL 
 
Sample totals: 8-127-124-88-33-11: 391 
 
Irish Times  2-40-29-31-9-3: 114 
 
Irish Independent                  2-38-24-18-7-4: 93 
 
Irish Examiner  3-15-21-17-5-1: 62 
 
Sunday Independent  0-7-14-11-3-1: 36 
 
Sunday Business Post  1-8-13-6-6-1: 35 
 
Sunday Tribune  0-14-14-0-0-0: 28 
 
Irish Mirror  0-5-9-5-3-0: 22 
 
Irish Daily Mail                 0-0-0-0-0-1: 1 
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Figure 3: Amplification of rating agency arguments/representations 
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Figure 4: Prominence of institutional sources; relative amplification of 
attributed opinions/arguments 
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Figure 5: Relative amplification of media opinion/arguments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
